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“I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws.”
Friedrich Nietzsche, the 19th-century German philosopher, is known for his provocative and sometimes enigmatic statements. The quote “I have often laughed at the weaklings who thought themselves good because they had no claws” can be interpreted in various ways, but it primarily targets conventional morality and the way ‘goodness’ is often defined.
Nietzsche often criticized the moral framework that he believed stemmed from religious or societal norms, particularly those that valorize qualities like meekness, humility, and compassion. In his view, these morals often serve as a refuge for individuals who lack the will to power, which is a fundamental drive Nietzsche posits exists in all individuals to some degree.
The “weaklings” Nietzsche mentions are those who conform to societal norms not out of a genuine sense of goodness, but rather because they lack the “claws”—the strength, will, or capability—to act otherwise. They’re ‘good’ not out of moral choice but due to their own limitations. According to Nietzsche, these individuals may call themselves ‘good,’ but their goodness is a passive result of their inability to be otherwise, rather than an active moral choice. They equate their lack of capability for harmful actions with moral superiority, which Nietzsche finds laughable and a misunderstanding of what true moral strength entails.
For Nietzsche, genuine goodness or virtue is a product of strength and an affirmation of life and one’s will to power. It is about possessing the “claws” to act in various ways but choosing to act in a manner that one deems as authentically good or meaningful.
This interpretation reflects Nietzsche’s broader critique of morality as being too simplistic and often serving as a disguise for weakness or a lack of vitality. This doesn’t mean Nietzsche was advocating for harmful or unethical behavior; rather, he was questioning the basis upon which moral judgments are often made.
Love one’s fate.
“My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.”
The concept of “amor fati,” or love of fate, is a central theme in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy. It embodies the idea that one should fully accept and even love the conditions of one’s life, no matter how challenging or difficult they might be. Nietzsche sees this unconditional acceptance as a hallmark of a great individual, and it’s encapsulated in the quote: “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.”
Nietzsche challenges the common wish to alter or escape one’s circumstances, arguing that doing so often emanates from a position of resentment or a rejection of life as it is. To “want nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity,” is to affirm life in its totality. It’s not merely a passive resignation to circumstances, but an active embrace of them. For Nietzsche, embracing one’s fate is a demonstration of the will to power, the fundamental drive he believes underlies all human actions.
In saying “not forward, not backward, not in all eternity,” Nietzsche accentuates the idea of an eternal recurrence, another significant concept in his philosophy. Eternal recurrence posits that every event in one’s life will recur infinitely in an eternal cycle. If you truly love your fate, you’d be willing to relive your life, in its grand triumphs and worst tragedies, an infinite number of times. The acceptance of eternal recurrence serves as a sort of existential litmus test: If you can love life so much that you’d willingly choose to relive it forever, you’ve achieved the sort of greatness Nietzsche describes.
The idea behind amor fati can be deeply empowering. By accepting and loving one’s fate, one gains a form of control over it. While you can’t always control what happens to you, you can control how you interpret and respond to what happens. In this way, amor fati is not a negation of ambition or change but rather a fundamental affirmation of life that enables meaningful action.
This concept links back to many of Nietzsche’s overarching philosophical ideas about life affirmation, the will to power, and the reevaluation of traditional morals and values. It poses a challenge to both religious and secular notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ inviting a more nuanced, life-affirming understanding of these terms.
The concept of “amor fati” resonates with Stoic philosophy, which also emphasizes the acceptance of fate and the things one cannot change. Stoics like Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius advocate for embracing whatever comes our way, viewing challenges as opportunities for growth and moral development. However, Nietzsche’s understanding of “amor fati” is not a direct import from Stoicism, and his philosophical stance has some crucial differences.
Nietzsche did have a complex relationship with Stoicism. On one hand, he admired the Stoic ideal of self-mastery and the emphasis on individual strength. On the other hand, he criticized the Stoics for what he perceived as their negation of life and their denial of the will to power, which he considered a fundamental drive in human beings.
For Nietzsche, Stoicism was too focused on restraint, self-denial, and emotional suppression. He saw the Stoic virtue of “apathy” (in its original sense of being without passions) as being at odds with his own philosophy, which celebrates life, instinct, and vitality. Nietzsche’s “amor fati” is less about emotional detachment from the world, as seen in Stoicism, and more about a full-throated embrace of life with all its complexities, contradictions, and challenges.
Another key difference lies in how each philosophy views the concept of “nature.” Stoicism advises living according to nature, which is rational and ordered. Nietzsche, however, sees nature as a manifestation of the will to power, which is neither rational nor ordered in a way that would be comforting to Stoicism. In Nietzschean terms, “amor fati” is less a rational choice and more an instinctual, life-affirming impulse.
So, while there are similarities between Stoicism’s acceptance of fate and Nietzsche’s “amor fati,” the underlying philosophy and implications differ significantly. Nietzsche took the concept in a direction that is more aligned with his views on life affirmation, individual will, and the reevaluation of moral values.
The Will to Nothingness.
“That every will must consider every other will its equal — would be a principle hostile to life, an agent of the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, a secret path to nothingness.”
Nietzsche is cautioning against the idea that all wills, or individual drives and ambitions, should be considered equal. He sees this notion as antithetical to life and even a threat to the future of humanity.
Nietzsche is not simply attacking the idea of political or social equality; rather, he is critiquing a deeper, more foundational notion that every individual will or drive should be valued equally. For Nietzsche, this is a denial of the inherent differences between individuals and their varying capacities for exerting their will to power—a fundamental concept in his philosophy. The will to power, according to Nietzsche, is the basic drive that fuels all life, and it manifests in myriad ways, from the desire for self-preservation to ambitions for influence, creativity, and transformation.
If every will is considered equal, Nietzsche argues that it inhibits the great individuals, the “overmen,” from rising and imposing their own values, which he sees as crucial for cultural and moral evolution. According to Nietzsche, the notion that all wills are equal acts as an “agent of dissolution and destruction” because it stymies the very forces that bring about growth, transformation, and improvement. The promotion of equality of wills is, to him, a sign of societal weariness and decline, a “secret path to nothingness.”
Nietzsche’s critique is also aimed at moral systems, particularly those rooted in Judeo-Christian ethics, which often promote the idea of the equal worth of all souls in the eyes of God. Nietzsche views this as a “slave morality,” which elevates meekness, humility, and other virtues of the weak, thereby undermining the virtues of the strong and inhibiting the flourishing of more potent wills.
The quote reflects Nietzsche’s broader themes of life affirmation, individualism, and the revaluation of values. He challenges us to think about how the principles we take for granted may actually be shaping the future of humanity in ways that may not be as beneficial as they appear on the surface.
